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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Under the Clean Air Act, did the lower court properly
find that a waiver of sovereign immunity permits New
Union to assess civil penalties against the United States
Department of the Interior ("DOI") when DOrs Improved
Coal Transport Experiment ("ICTE") was cited for violat-
ing air quality standards, ignored a warning from regula-
tory authorities, and persisted in its air polluting activities
for three and a half years?
II. Under the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") and the Administrative Procedure Act, did the
lower court properly find that the Environmental Impact
Statement prepared by DOI for ICTE is subject to judicial
review for compliance with NEPA procedures when DOI
volunteered to prepare the EIS in response to public
controversy?
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STATEMENT OF TIRE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
In April 1985, the U.S. Department of the Interior
("DOI") initiated the Improved Coal Transport Experiment
("ICTE") at its Coal Research Facility ("CRACT"). (R. 3). For
four years, DOI operated its ICTE project without the knowl-
edge of state environmental agencies or private citizens. (R.
3). Although the project began in April 1985, New Union's
Department of Environmental Quality ("NUDEQ") did not in-
spect ICTE until September 1989. (R. 3). Upon inspection of
the CRACT facility, NUDEQ discovered that ICTE released
coal particles into the air and promptly cited DOI for viola-
tions of New Union's Clean Air Act ("NUCAA"). (R. 3). Soon
thereafter, the non-profit environmental group Sunpeace pe-
titioned DOI to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") for ICTE. (R. 4).
CRACT is a facility owned and operated by DOI to study
ways to make coal mining more efficient and economical. (R.
2). The facility employs 800 federal workers, which consti-
tutes twenty percent of the New Union work force.
Under the auspices of CRACT, DOI initiated ICTE to de-
velop a new technique to package coal for transport. (R. 3).
The technique is relatively simple. Coal is heated to 400 de-
grees then pulverized in a machine called a 'jumbler." (R. 3).
Pulverized coal can be transported more economically than
unprocessed coal chunks. (R. 3). The technique's environ-
mental effects, however, are substantial. The jumbler re-
leases dangerous quantities of coal particles into the air. (R.
3).
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The particulate matter emitted by ICTE exceeds the
safety limit set by the NUCAA. (R. 3). On September 30,
1989, NUDEQ inspected and cited CRACT for violating the
state's air pollution standards. (R. 3). In a letter to DOI re-
garding the violation, NUDEQ's Administrator asserted ju-
risdiction to regulate the facility and explained the NUCAA
air quality standards. (R. 3). No penalties were assessed at
that time. (R. 3).
For the next three and a half years - September 30,
1989 until April 27, 1993 - DOI continued to operate ICTE
as before. (R. 3). DOI ignored the Administrator's letter,
making no attempt to comply with NUCAA. (R. 3). On April
27, 1993, NUDEQ inspected the CRACT facility again and
found that DOI continued to violate the NUCAA. (R. 3). The
inspector immediately notified the NUDEQ Administrator
who authorized the assessment of $300,000 in civil penalties
against DOI. (R. 3).
DOI refused to submit the penalty but promised to bring
ICTE into compliance with the NUCAA. (R. 3). In a letter to
the NUDEQ Administrator, DOI claimed that the Clean Air
Act ("CAA") did not waive the federal government's sovereign
immunity from state assessment of civil penalties. (R. 3).
DOI recognized its responsibility to comply with the NUCAA
air quality standards. (R. 3). Without further deliberation,
DOI decided to build a hangar and baghouse around the
ICTE facility. (R. 3). DOI claimed that the hangar and
baghouse would filter enough particulate matter to bring
ICTE into compliance with the NUCAA air quality stan-
dards. (R. 3).
Finally, ICTE's environmental impacts were exposed to
the public. (R. 3). Controversy ensued. Sunpeace called for
the immediate suspension of the ICTE project. (R. 3). The
editors of the New Union Times publicly supported Sun-
peace's efforts. (R. 4).
Responding to this controversy, DOI promised to prepare
an EIS for the ICTE project. (R. 4). It placed a notice in the
Federal Register on June 26, 1993 stating that "even though
the hangar and baghouse will not significantly affect the
quality of the human environment, CRACT has determined
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/4
MEASURING BRIEF
that it is in the public interest to prepare an EIS on the ICTE
program." (R. 4). In a single announcement, DOI published a
Finding of No Significant Impact ("FONSI") which concluded
that "any operation of ICTE that complied with NUCAA stan-
dards would have no significant impact on the human envi-
ronment." (R.4). DOI further promised to prepare an EIS for
ICTE. (R. 4). DOI indicated that a Record of Decision and
the Final EIS would be completed one year later. (R. 4).
Pending completion of the EIS, DOI pledged to reduce ICTE's
output to bring the facility into compliance with the NUCAA.
(R. 4).
In December 1993, DOI published a "Draft EIS on the
ICTE Program." (R. 4). The EIS considered only two alterna-
tives to bring itself into compliance with the NUCAA: (1)
maintaining output levels and utilizing a hangar and
baghouse or (2) reducing the ICTE production levels perma-
nently. (R. 4). The EIS did not consider the "no action" alter-
native of terminating the ICTE project. Sunpeace submitted
written comments to DOI regarding the Draft EIS. (R. 4).
Sunpeace pointed out that under federal law DOI is obligated
to consider the "no action" alternative in the EIS. (R. 4).
In response to Sunpeace's comments, DOI claimed that
the "no action" alternative is "outside the scope of [the] EIS
and beyond the requirements of this EIS." (R. 4). DOI opted
for the previously selected alternative - building a hangar
and baghouse. (R. 4). DOI then published the "Final EIS on
the ICTE Program" and Record of Decision. (R. 4).
B. Procedural History
Pursuant to the CAA, New Union filed suit against DOI
for refusing to submit civil penalties assessed under the NU-
CAA. (R. 4). Sunpeace filed suit against the DOI, based on
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act ("APA"), claiming that the EIS is
inadequate. (R. 4). The two actions were consolidated by the
district court. (R. 4). Sunpeace and New Union joined as
amici on the suits to which they were not plaintiffs. (R. 4).
1995] 683
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The District Court for the District of New Union con-
cluded that DOI is liable for civil penalties under the CAA
and rejected the DOI's argument that sovereign immunity
shields it from such penalties. (R. 5). The court found that
the CAA has a "clear and unambiguous" waiver of sovereign
immunity. The Act's plain language does not limit the of civil
penalties as does the language of the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"). (R. 5). Further, the court found that the legisla-
tive history of the CAA supports the waiver. (R. 5).
The court also held that if DOI prepares an EIS, even
when not required by NEPA, the EIS must comply with the
requirements of NEPA and the CEQ regulations. (R. 6). An
EIS voluntarily completed will be held "to the normal stan-
dards of judicial review." (R. 6). The court then found that
DOI failed to comply with the NEPA requirements because
the ICTE-EIS does not discuss the "no action" alternative.
(R. 6).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Sunpeace urges this court to affirm the two findings of
the lower court. First, the lower court properly found that
sovereign immunity does not shield DOI from civil penalties
assessed under the Clean Air Act. DOI argues that a waiver
must be clear and unambiguous. Sunpeace proves that the
waiver in the CAA meets this burden. The statutory lan-
guage of the federal facilities and the citizen suits provisions
provide a broad waiver of immunity, and the legislative his-
tory supports the intent of Congress to include such a waiver.
Further, the purpose of the CAA as a whole cannot be
achieved unless there is judicial recognition of the waiver.
Second, the lower court properly found that the ICTE-
EIS is subject to judicial review for NEPA compliance. Judi-
cial review of an agency's compliance with NEPA is available
under the APA. DOI argues that because it volunteered, and
was not compelled by law, to prepare the ICTE-EIS, the EIS
is not covered by NEPA. The District Court rejected this ar-
gument. Sunpeace demonstrates that DOI is required by
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/4
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statute to prepare an EIS for the ICTE project. Furthermore,
Sunpeace agrees with the District Court that even if DOI vol-
untarily prepared the ICTE-EIS, the EIS must be prepared in
compliance with NEPA's procedural requirements. Judicial
Review of the ICTE-EIS is necessary to compel DOI to comply
with NEPA.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for both questions presented in
this appeal is de novo. The first question is whether the
lower court's interpretation of the CAA correctly identified a
waiver of sovereign immunity to civil penalties. The second
question is whether the lower court properly interpreted
NEPA and the APA to permit judicial review of a voluntary
EIS. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of
law which is reviewed de novo. E.J. Friedman Co. v. United
States, 6 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1993). "Interpretations of
[environmental] regulations present questions of law, which
are reviewable de novo." Oregon Environmental Council v.
Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 1987).
ARGUMENT
I. THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT NEW
UNION CAN ASSESS CIVIL PENALTIES AGAINST
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR FOR
VIOLATING AIR QUALITY STANDARDS BECAUSE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY HAS BEEN WAIVED
UNDER THE FEDERAL FACILITIES AND THE
CIVIL PENALTIES PROVISIONS OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT.
DOI must submit civil penalties to the State of New
Union for its violation of air pollution standards at CRACT.
NUCAA is authorized under the CAA to regulate air pollu-
tion within its jurisdiction. (R. 3). New Union has the power
to impose civil penalties on polluters that fail to comply with
properly promulgated air quality standards. The penalties
sought by New Union are well-warranted given CRACT's
three and a half year failure to bring its ICTE program into
1995] 685
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compliance with the state's particulate matter standards.
DOI cannot escape liability by claiming immunity as a fed-
eral facility because the CAA contains a clear and unambigu-
ous waiver of sovereign immunity to civil penalties.
When reviewing the CAA for a waiver of sovereign im-
munity, the Court must look to "the whole law, and to its ob-
ject and policy." Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713
(1975). The Court must read statutory provisions not as iso-
lated enactments but as part of a comprehensive legislative
plan. If possible, every word, phrase, and passage must be
given "effect" through judicial interpretation. 2A Norman J.
Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 (5th ed.
1992) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955);
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990) (Scalia, con-
curring); Mountain States T&T v. Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237
(1985)). The Court must start with the "language of the stat-
ute;" however, "[iut is a well-established principle of statutory
construction that words of a statute are to be placed in their
proper context by resort to legislative history where they are
not conclusive as to congressional intent." Ohio ex rel. Cele-
brezze v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21210 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1987) (citing
Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 158 (1972)).
The Court will find an express waiver of sovereign immunity
for civil penalties under the CAA when it when it gives "ordi-
nary meaning" and "common usage" to the statutory lan-
guage, Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 (1984), and
reads that language in light of the Act's legislative history.
This court should recognize the clear and unambiguous
waiver of sovereign immunity within the CAA's federal facili-
ties provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1988 & Supp. V 1993),
within the citizen suits provision, § 7604, and within the ba-
sic policy of the CAA as a whole. This court should afrm the
district court's holding that DOI must submit civil penalties
for its knowing violations of New Union's air pollution laws.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/4
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A. The plain language and the legislative history of the
Clean Air Act's federal facilities provision waive
sovereign immunity to civil penalties so that New
Union can assess civil penalties against the
Department of the Interior.
i) New Union can assess civil penalties against the
Department of the Interior because the federal
facilities provision waives sovereign immunity
to civil penalties.
Section 118 of the CAA provides a broad waiver of sover-
eign immunity to civil penalties. Federal facilities such as
CRACT must comply with "all Federal, State, interstate and
local requirements, administrative authority, and process
and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air
pollution." § 7418. The United States must respect air pollu-
tion standards "to the same extent as any nongovernmental
entity" and is subject to "any process and sanction, whether
enforced in Federal, State, or local courts . . . " § 7418(a).
DOI must submit to "any" process and sanction that a court
has power to enforce, including civil penalties.
Congress included words like "any" and "all" in the statu-
tory language to effect a broad waiver of sovereign immunity
to civil penalties: "The plain language of the statute reveals
its expansiveness." United States v. South Coast Air Quality
Management Dist., 748 F. Supp. 732, 738 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
Section 118 is not limited to particular sanctions or processes
but is open to a full array of enforcement mechanisms. In
South Coast Air Quality, the court found that section 118
waived the sovereign immunity of the federal government to
fees and taxes. Id. In the same way that the court in South
Coast Air Quality found that fees and taxes are "require-
ments" under section 118, this Court should find that civil
penalties are "sanctions" that may be applied against DOI.
See also Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (overruled by
congressional amendment to section 118 which established
that state permits are "requirements" to which federal facili-
ties must comply).
1995] 687
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A waiver of sovereign immunity must be "strictly con-
strued," Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986),
but does not need to be expressed by a laundry list of statu-
tory terms: "There is no requirement that Congress express
its waiver by means of a list approach." South Coast Air
Quality, 748 F. Supp. at 738. Civil penalties may be applied
against DOI as "sanctions" despite the fact that section 118
does not individually list penalties and other enforcement
mechanisms. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S.
174, 183-84 (1988) (including "supplemental awards" in a
waiver of sovereign immunity for "penalties" under a work-
men's compensation law although such awards were not
listed).
Congress affirmed that waivers of sovereign immunity
may be broad when it overruled Hancock v. Train and
amended section 118 to include expansive terms like "any"
and "all":
In the committee's view, the language of the existing law
should have been sufficient to insure Federal compliance in
all the aforementioned situations. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the U.S. Supreme Court construed section 118 nar-
rowly in Hancock v. Train ....
H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1079. Courts are required to look for
"clear and unambiguous" congressional intent to waive sover-
eign immunity. However, courts may not "assume the au-
thority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended," nor
"construe the waiver 'unduly restrictively,'" Bowen, 476 U.S.
at 479 (quoting Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287
(1983)); Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94
(1990). To read section 118 narrowly and apply a "list" ap-
proach to statutory construction would thwart congressional
intent.
Congress considered and rejected a blanket application of
sovereign immunity. Section 118 "shall apply notwithstand-
ing any immunity of such agencies, officers, agents, or em-
ployees under any law or rule of law." § 7418 (emphasis
added). By the specific words of section 118, "sanctions," such
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/4
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as civil penalties, shall be applied "notwithstanding" any type
of legal immunity that might be invoked by DOI as a federal
entity. See State of Alabama ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans Ad-
min., 648 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (holding fed-
eral facility liable for civil penalties for violation of state air
pollution regulations "notwithstanding any immunity of such
agencies"). Embodying a broad waiver of sovereign immu-
nity, section 118 "removed the legal barriers to full federal
compliance with state air quality regulations, except for those
exceptions expressly provided in that section." See In the
Matter of Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency Payment of
Civil Penalty for Violations of Local Air Quality Standards,
Comp. Gen. B-191747, 1978 WL 9814 (C.G. June 6, 1978).
Additionally, the waiver of sovereign immunity in the
CAA is distinguishable from the treatment of civil penalties
under the RCRA and the CWA. The Supreme Court has held
that the phrase "process and sanction" in the RCRA and the
CWA indicated that there was no waiver of sovereign immu-
nity to punitive penalties, only to "coercive" penalties neces-
sary to enforce judicial process. See United States Dep't of
Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992). The CAA can be dis-
tinguished from the RCRA and the CWA because it does not
contain additional language that limits "sanctions" to pro-
cess-related penalties.
Both RCRA and CWA include provisions not found in the
CAA, defining "sanctions" as penalties that are used to "en-
force an order" or to enforce "such injunctive relief" by a
court. The RCRA's federal compliance provision allows for
"such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such
relief... Neither the United States, nor any agent, employee
or officer thereof, shall be immune or exempt from any pro-
cess or sanction of any State or Federal Court with respect to
the enforcement of any such injunctive relief." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6961 (1988). The federal facilities section in the CWA
states, "the United States shall be liable only for those civil
penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or
local court to enforce an order or the process of such court."
33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988). The "sanctions" under the CWA and
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the RCRA are distinctly linked to penalties of a "coercive"
nature.
Absent such limiting language, the CAA's federal facili-
ties section does not likewise restrain the court from enforc-
ing civil penalties for punitive purposes. The phrase "process
and sanction," standing alone, does not limit the ability of
courts to enforce noncompliance penalties against recalci-
trant polluters. Rather, the language of section 118 allows
for any "process and sanction" to be applied against the DOI,
regardless of whether the sanction is used for punitive or co-
ercive purposes.
The statutory language of the CAA contains a clear and
unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity. In light of such
an express statutory waiver, DOI cannot invoke sovereign
immunity to avoid paying civil penalties for its violations of
the NUCAA. The legislature did not intend to leave New
Union without enforcement power merely because the pol-
luter is a federal facility rather than a private polluter.
(ii) New Union can assess civil penalties against the
Department of the Interior because Congress
intended to provide a clear and unambiguous
waiver of sovereign immunity in the federal
facilities provision.
This Court should look at the legislative history of the
CAA to affirm that Congress intended to waive sovereign im-
munity and to require that federal facilities be subject to civil
penalties for their air pollution violations. See Hancock, 426
U.S. at 167 (analyzing legislative intent of the CWA and
CAA); see also McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v.
Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (considering
legislative intent when determining whether federal facilities
subject to civil penalties under the RCRA and the CWA).
First, Congressional discussion of the CAA Amendments
of 1977 demonstrates its intent to waive the sovereign immu-
nity of the federal government in the assessment of civil pen-
alties. The amendment was designed "to express with
sufficient clarity, the committee's desire to subject Federal fa-
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cilities to all Federal, State, and local requirements - proce-
dural, substantive, or otherwise - process and sanctions."
H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1278 (emphasis added). The
amendment was a broad and general waiver of sovereign im-
munity, and one in which there was "no need for Congress to
proceed to describe an explicit waiver of every conceivable 're-
quirement' comprehended in the described generic category
of 'requirements'." Maine v. United States Dep't of the Navy,
702 F. Supp. 322, 327 (D. Me. 1988).
Second, Congress intended that the states apply enforce-
ment sanctions against all polluters including federal facili-
ties: "The applicable sanctions are to be the same for Federal
facilities and personnel as for privately owned pollution
sources..." and "Federal facilities and agencies may be sub-
ject to injunctive relief.. .to civil or criminal penalties, and to
delayed compliance penalties." H.R. Rep. No. 294, reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1279 (emphasis added). Congress
was explicit in its intent to require that federal polluters be
subject to punitive, civil penalties just as private violators.
This express legislative intent demonstrates that section 118
waives sovereign immunity for federal facilities.
The legislative history also reveals that one of the goals
of the CAA is to establish the means necessary for state and
local governments to enforce the requirements of the Act. See
H.R. Rep. No. 294, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1079. If
the states are empowered to enforce the requirements of the
Act, that power must include the power to assess penalties
against all violators, including the federal government. State
and local governments cannot enforce the requirements of the
Act if a major pollution source - the federal government - is
immune.
Therefore, it would be against congressional intent and
the purpose of the CAA to allow DOI to shield itself from New
Union's civil penalties merely because it is a federal polluter.
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B. The Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision authorizes
assessment of civil penalties against the Department
of the Interior.
Under the citizen suit section of the Clean Air Act, New
Union is authorized to file suit against the federal govern-
ment for violations of federal and state air pollution laws.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988). This section authorizes "any
person" to file a civil action against individuals and entities
that violate the provisions of the Act, § 7604(a), and the Act's
definition of "person" includes the states. § 7602(e). DOI, as
a federal "governmental instrumentality or agency" may be
held liable under this provision for failure to comply with
emission standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). The district court has jurisdiction to review
citizen suits and to "enforce such an emission standard or
limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to
perform such act or duty.. .and to apply any appropriate civil
penalties." § 7604(a).
From the plain language of the statute, New Union may
bring a citizen suit against CRACT, a facility owned by the
United States, and may receive court enforcement of "any ap-
propriate civil penalties." Section 7604(e) reinforces the
waiver of sovereign immunity for civil penalties:
Nothing in this section or in any other law of the United
States shall be construed to prohibit, exclude, or restrict
any State, local, or interstate authority from - (2) bring-
ing any administrative enforcement action or obtaining
any administrative remedy or sanction in any State or lo-
cal administrative agency, department or instrumentality,
against the United States, any department, agency, or in-
strumentality thereof, or any officer, agent, or employee
thereof under State or local law respecting control and
abatement of air pollution.
42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1988). This section allows states to ex-
tract "any administrative remedy or sanction" in "any State
or local administrative agency" against the United States,
The civil penalty assessed against the Department of Interior
by NUCAA would fall under this section. Congress "specifi-
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cally provided for the liability of federal agencies to pay civil
penalties administratively imposed by the states." In the
Matter of Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, Comp. Gen.
B-191747, 1978 WL 9814, at *1.
The waiver of sovereign immunity within the citizen suit
provision is further evidenced by reading the CAA as "a
whole law" and not merely just looking at individual statu-
tory provisions. Other sections that discuss appropriate civil
penalties reinforce the district court's conclusion that Con-
gress waived sovereign immunity for such penalties. Section
7420 of the Act describes the use of noncompliance penalties
under the CAA. 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
That section provides that "the State or Administrator...
shall assess and collect a noncompliance penalty against
every person who owns or operates ... a stationary source
which is not in compliance with an emission limitation, emis-
sion standard, standard of performance." § 7420(a)(2)(A). As
discussed above, the definition of "person" under the Act in-
cludes the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1988). Since
the general definition of "person" must be applied throughout
the Act unless otherwise indicated, section 7420's noncompli-
ance penalties can be assessed against the United States, and
consequently, against DOI.
The phrase "any appropriate civil penalties," when given
"common meaning" and "ordinary usage," does not allow the
government to avoid the assessment of civil penalties. The
descriptive term "any" indicates Congressional intent to place
the full spectrum of civil penalties at the district court's dis-
posal subject to court discretion as to which penalty is "appro-
priate" under specific circumstances.
There is no distinction between different penalties under
the CAA. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court distin-
guished between coercive and punitive penalties under the
CWA and the RCRA based upon an analysis of the phrase
"process and sanctions" and supporting statutory language.
Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct at 1637. The Court concluded that
the only allowable penalties were "coercive" ones used to en-
force judicial process. Id. Under the CAA's citizen suit provi-
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sion, the civil penalty language is carefully worded to prevent
any implied relationship to court judicial process:
The district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce
such an emission standard or limitation, or such an order,
or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty
.. and to apply any appropriate civil penalties.
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
The conjunction "and" indicates that courts have the author-
ity to assess civil penalties independent of their ability to is-
sue injunctions and to penalize parties for noncompliance
with judicial orders.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the civil penalty provi-
sions of the CWA and the RCRA are inapposite. See Dep't of
Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1627. Under the RCRA and the CWA, a
state may sue under the citizen suit section and receive civil
penalties. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988) (CWA); 42 U.S.C.§ 6972(a) (1988) (RCRA). However, the civil penalty sections
of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988), and the RCRA, 42
U.S.C. 88 6928(a) and (g) (1988), do not provide for assess-
ments of such penalties against the federal government. Pen-
alties are available against "persons" who violate the CWA
and the RCRA, but the United States is omitted from the
statutes' definitions of a "person" in both statutes. Dep't of
Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1634-35. The omission of the United
States from the civil penalty section "has to be seen as a
pointed one when so many other governmental entities are
specified, a fact that renders the civil penalties section inap-
plicable to the United States." Id. at 1635. The CAA is dis-
tinguishable from the Department of Energy holding because
as mentioned above, the CAA definition of "persons" includes
the United States.
In its Department of Energy holding, the Supreme Court
reviewed the CWA and the RCRA by "giving effect to all the
language of the citizen-suit sections." Id. When the Court
follows the same textual analysis in the instant case, it will
find that a clear and unequivocal waiver exists. Unlike under
the CWA and the RCRA, a waiver of sovereign immunity is
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consistent with the statutory language of the citizen suit pro-
vision of the Clean Air Act when read in light of the civil pen-
alties provisions.
Therefore, under the CAA's citizen suit provision, sover-
eign immunity does not bar the assessment of civil penalties
against DOI.
C. A waiver of sovereign immunity is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the Clean Air Act.
Policy arguments support the judicial recognition of a
waiver of sovereign immunity to civil penalties under the
CAA. Application of civil penalties against federal violators
will ensure federal compliance with air pollution laws, foster
state and local support for projects like ICTE, and protect the
community of New Union from the health hazards of air pol-
lutants. These civil penalties will not create undue economic
burdens on the federal government.
First, this court should acknowledge the CAA's waiver of
sovereign immunity in order to ensure federal compliance
with air pollution laws. Injunctive relief does not deter fed-
eral agencies from violating clean air requirements. Unlike
injunctions, civil penalties threaten federal facilities because
they are assessed immediately and accrue over the time in
which a violator fails to respond. See Mirth White, Can Con-
gress Draft A Statute Which Forces Federal Facilities To
Comply With Environmental Laws In Light Of The Holding
In the United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 15 Whit-
tier L. Rev. 203 (1994).
Data collected by the Government Accounting Office
("GAO") supports this proposition. In the CWA, states are
limited to injunctive relief against federal facilities because
the Court has found no waiver of sovereign immunity. As a
result, federal facilities are not complying with environmen-
tal laws when subject to injunctive penalties. Federal non-
compliance with the CWA is twice that of private industry.
GAO, Report To Congressional Requestors: Stronger Enforce-
ment Needed To Improve Compliance of Federal Facilities 3
(1988). This indicates not only that federal facilities are not
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complying, but also that private industries which are subject
to civil penalties are complying at a much greater rate. Simi-
larly, federal facilities' compliance with RCRA was also poor
during the time when injunctions were the only available re-
lief. "Despite the undisputed availability of injunctions and
court-ordered sanctions to enforce them [injunctions], federal
facilities have a long record of noncompliance [with RCRA]."
Elizabeth Cheng, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker: Assessing Civil
Penalties Against Federal Facilities Under RCRA, 57 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 845, 861 (1990). To avoid similar results with the
Clean Air Act, federal facilities must be subjected to civil
penalties.
In this case, the powerful deterrent effect of civil penal-
ties is evident. DOI reacted to NUDEQ's letter only after the
NUDEQ Administrator authorized the assessment of
$300,000 in civil penalties. (R. 3). During the three and a
half year period from the time when NUDEQ sent DOI its
first warning letter to the time when civil penalties were as-
sessed, DOI did not respond. (R. 3). Once NUDEQ assessed
civil penalties, DOI quickly responded. The threat of civil
penalties had an immediate effect. In order to achieve the
goal of cleaner air, New Union needs the deterrent power of
civil penalties. New Union must be able to collect the penal-
ties from DOI and from other federal violators.
Second, civil penalties against federal violators will not
create undue economic burdens on the federal government.
Civil penalties ensure compliance with environmental laws
and avoid the costly alternatives of cleaning up polluted sites
or closing down facilities. Post-pollution cleanup and the in-
tangible costs to human health from such pollution are stag-
gering and far outweigh the cost of a civil penalty. See Daniel
Home, Federal Facility Environmental Compliance After
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 65 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 631, 656 (1994) (comparing a $40 to $70 billion cleanup
cost at a federal facility with the lower cost of civil penalties).
Armed with a civil penalty, the state can deter polluters
without having to resort to the complete shutdown of facili-
ties. Approximately 20% of New Union workers are em-
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ployed at CRACT. (R. 2). Closing the plant, even
temporarily, would cause serious economic repercussions.
New Union needs to take strong action against DOI for
its ongoing violations at that facility. New Union has pri-
mary authority to protect the quality of air within its jurisdic-
tion. Allowing DOI to casually disregard the health and
safety of the surrounding community infringes on the state's
responsibilities and erodes public confidence in government
accountability.
The people of New Union are outraged because of the ac-
tivities at CRACT. People distrust CRACT, DOI, and the
ICTE program. The public wants to shut down ICTE. (R. 3,
4). A civil penalty is an ideal means of addressing DOrs will-
ful violations, thus assuaging community misgivings, while
at the same time providing an avenue for future community
support of ICTE. By accepting its responsibility to comply
with the NUCAA and recognizing its past violations, DOI and
the CRACT facility will ultimately benefit.
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR FOR THE IMPROVED COAL
TRANSPORT EXPERIMENT IS SUBJECT TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW.
DOI circumvented the twin goals of NEPA - informed
decision making and public disclosure - by inadequately
studying the environmental impacts of ICTE. To ensure that
NEPA's two procedural purposes are enforced, this court
should review and reject the EIS prepared for the ICTE pro-
ject by DOI.
Regardless of whether the EIS is statutorily required or
was voluntarily prepared by DOI, judicial review of the ICTE-
EIS is available and necessary. Judicial review provides the
only assurance that DOI will comply with NEPA's minimal
procedural requirements for environmental decision making.
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A. Judicial review of the ICTE-EIS is available pursuant
to the National Environmental Policy Act and the
Administrative Procedure Act.
NEPA creates a zone of procedural rights that is policed
by the courts under the APA. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978). Under section 102 of NEPA, federal agencies
have a duty to comply with certain minimal procedures when
preparing an EIS. Id. Under section 702 of the APA, citizens
have a corresponding right to petition the court when an
agency does not comply with NEPA. Id. Section 702 of the
APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because
of an agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is en-
titled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988); see
also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
410 (1971).
This court has the power to review the ICTE-EIS under
the APA and NEPA. When an EIS does not conform with
NEPA's requirements, judicial review of the EIS is available
by implied judicial power and under the APA. Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm'n v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (implied judi-
cial review); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers of the United States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) (implied judicial
review); Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 542 (judicial review
under APA); Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th
Cir. 1988) (judicial review under the APA). Federal courts
may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over NEPA cases as
a federal question. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1331).
NEPA requires DOI to prepare an EIS for the ICTE pro-
ject and, thus DOrs failure to file an EIS is actionable under
NEPA. Even if NEPA does not require DOI to file an EIS,
however, Sunpeace has a justiciable claim under NEPA and
the APA. By volunteering to complete an EIS, DOI triggered
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NEPA's procedural requirements and opened its EIS to judi-
cial review.
B. The National Environmental Policy Act requires the
Department of the Interior to prepare the ICTE-EIS.
NEPA, as implemented by the Council on Environmental
Quality ("CEQ") regulations and interpreted by the courts,
requires a federal agency to prepare an EIS, whenever its pro-
posed project significantly affects the human environment.
NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988); CEQ Guidelines,
40 C.F.R. § 1502 (1993); e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citi-
zens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 336 (1988). Agencies must pre-
pare an EIS for every project that satisfies three preliminary
requirements. The project must: (1) be federal, (2) be major,
and (3) have significant environmental impacts. Because
ICTE satisfies each of these requirements, DOI is required by
statute to prepare an EIS for the ICTE project.
First, the ICTE project is federal. An action is federal
when it is "potentially subject to federal control and responsi-
bility." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. Because the DOI independently
owns and operates ICTE, the project is undeniably federal.
Second, the ICTE project is major. A federal action is
major when it "requires substantial planning, time, re-
sources, or expenditure." NRDC v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. at
366-67. The DOI has committed substantial planning and
time to ICTE. The project was initiated four years ago and
continues today. In addition, the DOI dedicates substantial
resources and expenditures to ICTE. ICTE's parent project,
the CRACT, requires 800 employees to operate. Salaries for
800 workers alone is a substantial cost. The overhead and
capital costs of ICTE and CRACT are not contained in the
record, but are surely substantial. Whether a project is major
depends not only on the project's physical size or dollar cost,
but also on the magnitude of its environmental effects. 40
C.F.R. § 1508.18 ("[mlajor reinforces but does not have mean-
ing independent of significantly"). Because the ICTE project
has substantial on-going impacts on air quality (and possibly
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on other environmental media), ICTE is a major federal
action.
Third, and most importantly, the ICTE project has sig-
nificant environmental impacts. NUDEQ has documented,
and DOI has superficially considered, the negative impacts of
ICTE on air quality. NEPA requires DOI to study the full
range of ICTE's potential environmental effects. Broadly de-
fining "significant impacts," the CEQ regulations require an
agency to consider direct and indirect effects, short- and long-
term effects, and cumulative impacts in an EIS. § 1508.27(a)-
(b). DOI has considered only ICTE's direct and short-term
effects on air quality; it has not studied the indirect, long-
term or cumulative effects of ICTE on the human
environment.
Dors recent compliance with New Union's air quality
standards does not nullify its duty to consider the other envi-
ronmental impacts of ICTE. ICTE's impacts on other envi-
ronmental media, such as water and soil, remain unstudied
and unknown. Compliance with the NUCAA and NEPA are
independent statutory duties. While the NUCAA sets sub-
stantive goals for air quality, NEPA outlines procedural re-
quirements for environmental assessments prepared by the
federal government. When NEPA's three trigger require-
ments are satisfied so that an EIS is required by statute,
however, the EIS must consider the full range of significant
environmental impacts.
Neither of the two narrow classes of NEPA exemptions
judicial or statutory - applies to ICTE. The courts have
implied limited exemptions from NEPA compliance where an
agency's procedures provide the "functional equivalent" of an
EIS. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Rucklehaus, 486 F.2d 375,
384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Because DOI employs no other pro-
cedures to compensate for its inadequate EIS, DOI may not
claim this exemption. The courts also have recognized a nar-
row exemption from NEPA's EIS requirement where compli-
ance with NEPA would result in a "clear and fundamental
conflict of statutory duty." Flint Ridge Development Co. v.
Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 791 (1976) (thirty day max-
imum before disclosure notice filing made NEPA compliance
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impossible); but see, Jones v. Gordon, 621 F. Supp. 7, 11 (D.
Alaska 1985) (ninety day limit to issue permit did not make
NEPA compliance impossible). DOI has not claimed that
compliance with NEPA and another federal mandate are mu-
tually exclusive.
Even if the court finds that the ICTE-EIS is not required
by statute, but was prepared voluntarily, DOI's failure to
comply with NEPA's requirements is nevertheless reviewable
under the APA.
C. Even if the Department of Interior volunteers to prepare
the ICTE-EIS, the EIS must be prepared in
compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act.
When a federal agency voluntarily decides to complete an
EIS, the agency must satisfy the minimum procedural re-
quirements for agency action imposed by NEPA. While a re-
viewing court may not impose additional requirements, the
court will require the agency to comply fully with the mini-
mum statutory procedures outlined in NEPA. See Vermont
Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548. When an agency promises to pre-
pare an EIS, the courts will hold the agency to its promise.
"When an agency follows a particular procedure, it is only log-
ical to review the agency's adherence to that procedure." Si-
erra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 966 (5th Cir. 1983).
When the Army Corps of Engineers voluntarily adopted
prospectively binding CEQ guidelines, the court reviewed an
EIS prepared by the Corps for full compliance with those
guidelines. Id. at 965. Although agencies were not required
to retroactively apply the guidelines, the Army Corps elected
to comply with the new guidelines. Reviewing the EIS for
compliance with the CEQ guidelines that the Army Corps
voluntarily adopted, the court found that the EIS was inade-
quate. Id. (following Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1974)).
In another case, when the Army Corps prepared a Sup-
plemental EIS (SEIS) that may not have been required by
NEPA, the court reviewed the SEIS for compliance with
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NEPA procedures. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 630 F. Supp.
1215, 1228 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (enjoining the construction of a
federal river project until the Army Corps took a "hard look"
at the environmental consequences of the project). The court
rejected the Corps argument that the revised EIS was a vol-
untarily prepared document for internal use, not for public
disclosure. Id. Endorsing the premise of Sigler and Cal-
laway, the court held that when the Corps used NEPA proce-
dures, it "made them applicable" to judicial review of the
SEIS. Id.
Similarly, this court should review DOI's compliance
with NEPA and the CEQ guidelines, even if the court finds
that DOI voluntarily decided to prepare an EIS. As the court
stated in Sierra Club v. Sigler, "[wlhen an agency voluntarily
announces its adherence to a particular regulation, it is the
adherence to the regulation which should be examined by the
reviewing court." Id. at 966. Although the courts have con-
sistently declined to hold agencies to substantive promises
made in an EIS, see, e.g., Stryckers' Bay Neighborhood Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980), courts have held
agencies accountable for procedural promises made, see, e.g.,
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Alexander, 480
F. Supp. 980, 993 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that the Army Corps
of Engineers must comply with procedures that it voluntarily
announced in the Federal Register).
In this case, Sunpeace requests only that DOI comply
with the minimum procedures outlined in NEPA and the
CEQ implementing regulations. The requested procedures
are not in excess of NEPA's procedural guarantees. This
court should enforce DOI's implied promise to follow NEPA
made when it announced its intent to prepare the ICTE-EIS.
D. Judicial Review of the EIS is necessary to effectuate the
intent of NEPA
Failure to review the ICTE-EIS would invite "abuse by
agencies attempting to insulate themselves from judicial
oversight mandated by the APA and NEPA." Sierra Club v.
Sigler, 695 F.2d at 966. The courts have an essential role in
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enforcing NEPA's "action-forcing" procedural mandate - in-
formed decision making and public disclosure. Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 349 (citing Balti-
more Gas and Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) and Weinberger v. Catho-
lic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139,
143 (1981)).
The ICTE-EIS was little more than post-hoc rationaliza-
tion of DOrs decision to comply with NUCAA by building a
hangar and baghouse. DOI did not use either environmental
assessment document to influence its decision or to educate
the public. This court should exercise its power of judicial re-
view to prevent DOI from further abdicating its NEPA
responsibilities.
(i) DOI did not consider the environmental impacts of
ICTE before deciding to operate the program.
One purpose of a NEPA environmental assessment is to
force an agency consider the impacts of a proposed activity
before the agency decides to begin the activity. The purpose
is not to decide how to best comply with another environmen-
tal standard after the activity has begun. DOI should use the
EIS to decide whether to operate or terminate the ICTE pro-
ject. The ICTE-EIS should not be used to justify a previously
made decision about how best to comply with the Clean Air
Act. Both the FONSI and the EIS are inadequate under
NEPA and the CEQ guidelines.
The FONSI should have been set aside as inadequate. In
its FONSI, DOI erroneously concluded that "any operation of
ICTE that complie[s] with [the New Union Clean Air Act]
would have no significant impact on the human environ-
ment." (R. 4). A FONSI cannot be predicated on compliance
with other environmental laws. See Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d
at 1125; Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 1971). In
short, DOI is not excused from NEPA compliance by adhering
to another environmental law.
Similarly, the EIS should be set aside as inadequate.
The EIS does not discuss a sufficiently broad range of alter-
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natives to the ICTE project. For an EIS to be adequate, the
"no action" alternative must be discussed. §§ 1502.14(d),
1508.25(b)(1); Comm. to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp.
731 (D. Conn. 1972). In addition, an adequate EIS for the
ICTE project would have investigated the use of alternate en-
ergy sources, such as solar power. See Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 835 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (an EIS prepared by DOI was deemed inadequate be-
cause it did not discuss all practical alternative sources of en-
ergy before deciding to lease offshore oil deposits). The ICTE-
EIS must discuss the existence of coal substitutes, including
solar energy, in order to be adequate.
DOI has not realized NEPA's first purpose, consideration
of the environmental impacts of a proposed project and alter-
natives to that project. As a consequence, DOI could not pos-
sibly realize NEPA's second purpose, public of the project's
environmental impacts. DOI could not disclose what it did
not consider.
(ii) DOI has not disclosed the environmental impacts
of the ICTE project to the public.
Disclosure of environmental analysis allows the public,
and the courts, to monitor the agency's compliance with
NEPA's procedural requirements. Without this disclosure,
agencies would be left to police their own compliance with
NEPA - a classic example of the "fox guarding the hen
house" problem. Public disclosure, backed by the threat ofju-
dicial review, is necessary to remedy this enforcement
problem.
DOI must not be permitted to devise a method of disclo-
sure that diverts public scrutiny. When the DOI published
the FONST, it also announced its intent to prepare an EIS.
(R. 4). At that time, Sunpeace immediately filed comments
on the Draft EIS. (R. 4). Commenting on the draft EIS, a
developing document, is a more productive endeavor than
challenging the adequacy of the FONSI, a completed docu-
ment. To penalize Sunpeace for commenting on the draft
EIS, instead of challenging the FONSI, would give federal
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1995] MEASURING BRIEF 705
agencies an incentive to prepare a "straw man" EIS to pre-
vent the public from scrutinizing its FONSI.
Therefore, this court should exercise its power of judicial
review to ensure DOrs compliance with NEPA's procedural
mandate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the
decision of the United States District Court for the District of
New Union thus enforcing civil penalties against DOI and re-
quiring DOI to prepare the ICTE-EIS in compliance with
NEPA.
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